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  1  
Introduction 
The protection of intellectual property rights (IPR) has been a contentious issue over the 
last 20 years.  Industrialized nations have moved to knowledge-based economies and 
simultaneously trade barriers have fallen, making intellectual property (IP) vulnerable.   Adding 
to this vulnerability are conflicting international institutional environments, belief systems, and 
economic realities. The debate over IPR protection has become a significant global trade issue 
pitting the net- technology producing North against the net-technology consuming South.  The 
North has a distinct belief system towards IP (Steidlmeier, 1993; Mittlestaedt and Mittlestaedt, 
1997), maintains a comprehensive IPR institutional environment, and actively employs 
enforcement mechanisms.  The South on the other hand, is more conflicted.  While in the last ten 
years many Southern countries have agreed to multilateral agreements on IPR protection, 
enforcement and real commitment has been lagging (Thurow, 1997; Levy, 2000). 
With this in mind there has been much debate about the impact of alternative IPR 
regimes (tight or loose) on the welfare of Southern economies.  Policy makers in both the South 
and the North search for arguments to convince recalcitrant Southern countries to follow the 
Northern model of strict IPR regimes.  The South faced with a dilemma, searches for arguments 
to justify loose IPR regimes or alternatively to convince its populace that tighter IPR regimes are 
better for the nation.   
While there has been much analytical work, mostly theoretical, conducted on the subject, 
the final results are inconclusive whether a strong IPR regime is better or worse for Southern 
countries (Vishwasrao, 1994; Sherwood and Braga, 1996; Globerman, 1998).  The lack of clarity 
 
  2 as to the impact of IPR regime has been due to both the complexity of problem and the form of 
analysis.  The theoretical models while being extremely valuable highlighting the drivers of firm 
and social welfare are by their nature abstractions.  
The empirical models to date suffer from three effects that weaken the impact of their 
conclusions.  The first is that often firms are not able to observe their losses from weak IPR 
(Fienberg and Rousslang, 1990). Many times the losses are due to investments not made and 
need to be estimated.  (Host country impact analysis too suffers from this problem.)  Second, 
firm impacts are generally estimates from surveys of a cross section of firms, representing 
opinions of impact not factual evidence (Evenson, 1990; Sherwood, 1990; Braga and Willmore, 
1991; Fienberg and Rousslang, 1991).  Finally, no work to our knowledge has attempted to 
directly measure firm and host country impacts from weak IPRs.   Therefore while there has 
been some attempt to empiricize welfare impacts, evidence supporting or negating the theory is 
lagging.  The end result for policy makers is there still remains much ambiguity and economic 
studies have yet to show where the balance should be struck (Alster, 1988; Dawson, 1987). 
The objective of this research is to add some empirical clarity of the welfare impacts of 
weak IPR.  To this end we employ a novel methodological design and a unique context.  While 
previous studies have used cross-sectional survey or secondary data, our research employs the 
critical case study approach (see Yin, 1994).  The research design is deductive, in that we use the 
empirical setting of Pioneer-Argentina, S.A., a seller of bioengineered agricultural seeds, to test 




  3 The dilemma, both domestically and internationally, for IPR protection is the trade off 
between short-term costs and long-term benefits.  The argument made by Northern countries is 
that while prices may rise in the short run, new technologies will be available over the long term 
and will, in turn, raise economic productivity (Stamm, 1993).   As the result of protected 
property rights, the South will gain from new investment (Sherwood and Braga, 1996), the flow 
of technology (Sherwood and Braga, 1996), and technology spillovers (Zigic, 2000).  The 
preferred mechanism of IPR protection by the net technology producing countries (North) is 
through public institutions, not product/process masking by private firms.  For the net 
technology using countries (South) the significant short term costs may arise directly from an 
increase in the cost of the input due to the lack of complete substitutes and indirectly from the 
administrative and enforcement costs of a Northern style IPR protection system.  Adding to the 
complexity is the fact that welfare impacts are best understood in a dynamic context, as the 
short-term losses of strengthening the South’s IPR regime are believed to be trumped by the 
long-term gain from economic growth. 
To address the complex question about the welfare impacts of an IPR regime, numerous 
theoretical models have been developed (Dollar, 1986; Chin and Grossman, 1988; Diwan, 1991; 
Deardorff, 1992; Helpman, 1993; Taylor, 1993; Maskus and Konan, 1994; Grossman and 
Helpman, 1995; Zigic, 1998).  While it is generally agreed that technology is important for an 
economy to grow (Dollar, 1986), the theoretical models are not completely successful making 
the argument that IPR protection in the South improves Southern welfare (Zigic, 2000; Gould 
and Gruben, 1996; Helpman, 1993; Chin and Grossman, 1990).  Additionally, the argument that 
strong IPRs lead to greater innovation too is questioned (Gould and Gruben, 1996; Braga and 
 
  4 Willmore, 1991).  The lack of clear benefits from IPR production can be due to a fundamental 
difference in belief systems about private versus communal property (Steidlmeier, 1993; 
Mittlestaedt and Mittlestaedt, 1997; Thurow, 1997; May, 1998), the negative affects of a 
monopolist on future innovation (Chin and Grossman, 1990; Gould and Gruben, 1996; and 
Zigic, 2000), a “tit for tat” view in which the South is “owed” the technology based on a history 
of Northern resource extraction policies, or the South’s assessment of the extreme hardship an 
enforced patent system would create.  Whether it is an intrinsic skepticism about Northern 
property right regimes or a skepticism based on the realities of the moment, the end result is 
recalcitrance on the part of Southern countries to actively engage IPR protection.  
Chin and Grossman (1990) developed a duopoly competition model of one Northern and 
one Southern firm.  The Northern firm’s problem is setting the optimum level of R&D 
investment.  The objective of the model is to analyze how each firm behaves as the IPR regime 
changes and how the firms’ behavior affects the level of innovation available to society.  One 
important conclusion of the model is there are certain conditions where the South is better off 
with weak IPR.  That is if the Southern market is small, which it generally is, and the technology 
jump is moderate, welfare in the South is improved from the improved product distribution and 
lower price. 
Diwan and Rodrik (1991) follow Chin and Grossman’s lead in modeling the welfare 
balance between the North and the South but diverge in several important ways.  They do not 
assume that holders of protected intellectual property have monopoly power.  There is free entry 
and exit.  The result of Chin and Grossman’s market power assumption is that the loss to 
Southern consumers is estimated to be very high due to the high price and reduced product 
 
  5 distribution a monopoly connotes.  But the direct mapping between a patent and a monopoly 
price is not axiomatic.  There are numerous forces such as a dynamic environment of innovation, 
product substitutes, and market power distribution across the supply chain that drive prices away 
from the monopoly price towards the competitive price (Goldsmith, 2001). While it is correct to 
assume that developers of intellectual property gain market power, and the patent system 
formalizes this position in the marketplace, it is incorrect to assume that holders of patents 
operate as monopolists.  While the monopoly/duopoly model may be appropriate in some cases, 
it is extreme in numerous situations where markets fall in between monopoly and pure 
competition.  This market structure assumption of course has great impact on welfare impact 
calculations.  In our case of agricultural biotechnology, barriers to entry are relatively low and 
the availability of substitutes relatively high, thus pure monopoly pricing practices should not be 
assumed.   The setting is more competitive, driving down prices and increasing access. Therefore 
under such situations the direct welfare gains (losses) to the North (South) from strong IPR may 
be much less than anticipated.   
Diwan and Rodrik also do not assume that preferences between the North and South are 
homogeneous.   This is important because it negates the free riding benefits for the South and at 
the same time causing a welfare loss in the South from the region to develop its own preferred 
and needed IP-based products.  This is not the case for our situation of marketing biotechnology 
seed in Argentina where North and South preferences map each other closely. 
Deardorff’s model (1992) is a monopoly model studying the regionalization of patents as 
a way of better allocating rents from innovation.  He offers the “Solomonic” strategy of limiting 
the regional applicability of patents, allowing some monopoly rent extraction while also 
 
  6 allowing for greater distribution.  The author unrealistically assumes regional patents can be 
operational as consumers and producers of innovation are not distinct groups, global information 
transmission is pervasive, and terms of trade will adjust.  
Helpman (1993) develops a dynamic general equilibrium model and in doing so attempts 
to grapple with the real effects of interlinked economies, terms of trade, and dynamic effects.  
His model captures the interplay between the North’s rate of innovation and the importance of 
imitation for providing northern consumers with a better mix of lower price products and the 
South with improved terms of trade.  The degree of imitation though is critical to the net welfare 
balance.  When the rate of imitation is low, both North and South benefit, as described above.  
When the rate of imitation is high, as is the case for many pharmaceutical and agricultural 
innovations such as biotechnology seed, the results do not hold and tighter IPR policy is 
preferred by the North. 
Taylor (1993) developed a partial equilibrium static North-South duopoly model to 
explore the interaction between masking (North) and imitation (South) and their associated costs. 
 The uniqueness of the model is in the endogeneity of the appropriability regime, where the firm 
has control, through masking and other private means to affect the rate of imitation. In this way 
the firm has some control over its ability to appropriate the rents from its intellectual property.  
Taylor concludes that the current state is pareto-inferior due to the extensive resources devoted 
to masking and unmasking significant technologies.  
Vishwasrao’s model (1994) concerns the optimal Northern firm strategy that maximizes 
profits given that a foreign licensee might pirate the technology and not pay the required 
royalties.  Therefore, while the Northern firm acting as monopolist may prefer to license, it 
 
  7 cannot because contracts aren’t enforceable and licensees pirate the technology.  In order to 
protect the monopoly the Northern firm internalizes the transactions through a wholly owned 
subsidiary shifting the net benefits back north.  
Zigic (2000) built a duopoly model whereby the South attained its market position 
through R&D spillovers, the leakage of important technical information, and the North achieved 
its market position through R&D.  The model involves four stages whereby the South chooses its 
optimal IPR regime in light of the fact that the North, assumed to be a significant trade partner 
would respond with high import tariffs, if the South chooses a weak IPR regime.  Like 
Vishwasrao, the model’s focus is how the North addresses the rent appropriability problem given 
a world of weak IPR. 
 
Theoretical Propositions 
The theory of welfare and IPR protection hinges on its theoretical propositions about how 
weak IPR in the South effects the welfare of firms, consumers, and Southern countries as a 
whole.  The following is an overview of nine propositions to be empirically analyzed using the 
Pioneer Case Study. They are organized into four topics; Southern Demand, Business Behavior, 
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Proposition #1:  Welfare in the South improves as preferences between the North and 
South are more homogeneous.   Diwan and Rodrik (1991) and Deardorff 
(1992) argue that homogeneity allows for free riding and more readily 
transfers benefits to the South under a weak IPR regime.  The South loses 
from a lack of access to the unique products it prefers.  For many 
products, including our case of marketing agricultural biotechnology in 
Argentina, demand is somewhat homogeneous.  The unique geographic 
and agronomic features of the Pioneer case provide excellent insight into how willing the northern firm is to invest in adapting the product to the 
local market (Argentina) and how willing the Southern consumer is 
willing to accept the risk of using a product that is sub-optimally adapted 
to the local environment. Pioneer can choose to leverage the homogeneity 
and avoid all adaptation to the Argentinean market or could choose to 
enhance its products for local use.  
 
Proposition #2:  The smaller the demand in the South relative to the North the more 
advantageous for the South to maintain weak IPR (Chin & Grossman, 
1990; Diwan & Rodrik, 1991; Taylor, 1993.)  This is due to the South’s 
ability to free ride on the technology combined with the lack of incentive 
by the North to market to the South even in a world of strong IPR. 
Pioneer’s investment behavior, which differs across products, not markets 




Proposition #3   Firms will engage in either masking or enforcement to try and protect their 
IP.  Vishwasrao (1994) and Chin and Grossman (19900 raise the issue of 
masking and its welfare effects.   The South is believed to be harmed by 
masking. While the firm is believed to have a net benefit from masking, 
there are costs (Globerman, 1988; Braga and Willmore, 1991; Taylor, 
1993). The Pioneer case will be used to study the masking, administrative, 
and enforcement (MAE) costs and strategies of the firm, its associated 
industry group, and the government. 
 
Proposition #4   Weak IPR reduces investment in the South.  Stamm (1993) refers directly 
to investment and its diversion away from the South to the North. 
Vishwasrao, 1994; Globerman, 1988; Mansfield, 1994; Sherwood, 1990; 
and Benko, 1987 refer to lowered R&D spending in the South, and Chin 
and Grossman (1990); Mansfield (1994); Helpman (1993); Benko (1987); 
Diwan & Rodrik (1991) hypothesize about how innovation is stifled in the 
South.  Zigic (1998) raises the issue of welfare spillovers.  The effects on 
investment are critical components of the indirect impacts from weak IPR 
and are necessary for conducting benefit-cost tests.  For example, a loose 
IPR regime might cause a firm to avoid a country.  The country not only 
loses by not having access to the latest technology, the firm would also be 
withholding investment in the country in support of the innovation.  These 
are the “pebble in the pond” effects from introducing a new product into a 
market.  They generally do not arrive in a limited fashion but can have 
broad indirect impacts on the economy. To empirically measure these 
ripple effects, our case study compares the relative levels of R&D, 
investment (human (Sherwood, 1990) and physical capital) between 
Pioneer units whose IP is affected against those whose IP is unaffected by 
 
  9 Argentina’s weak IPR regime.  
 
Proposition #5   Weak IPR causes a negative performance bias on the Southern operations 
of the technology firm.  Sherwood believes that production processes will 
be outdated; Stamm states that service levels will be lowered and the 
distribution system will be less reliable.  Agricultural seed production 
involves three distinct stages beyond R&D; Multiplication, Processing, 
and Distribution. Each one of these will be assessed in terms of the impact 
of weak IPR.  If theory is correct there should be measurable operational 
differences between the units due to IP risk. 
 
Financial Impacts 
Proposition #6   Weak IPR reduces return on investment (Stamm, 1993).   The financial 
data on Pioneer-Argentina will be analyzed estimating the differences in 
return on investment, as well as other financial metrics, between the two 
units.  Chin and Grossman (1990) and Globerman (1988) expect lower 
profits.  An important factor is the level of technological appropriability 
(Diwan and Rodrik, 1981; Teece, 1987).  This is the degree to which the 
owner of the intellectual property is able to generate a return and is a 
function of technological feasibility as well as permissiveness of the IPR 
environment (Teece, 1987). 
If severe financial harm is assumed to occur by these theorists, then there 
should be evidence in terms of the intensity of the firm’s lobbying effort 
and degree of internalization (Vishwasrao, 1994; Globerman, 1988). The 
analysis of Pioneer’s lobbying behavior and financial performance will 
shed light on how bad (good) the second best outcome is for the firm 
under weak IPR.  This analysis will provide some insight into Chin and 
Grossman’s claim that strong IPR always benefits the firm by answering 
the question of how “bad” is a second best strategy under weak IPR.   
 
Technology Flow 
Proposition #7   Weak IPR allows access to new technologies that improve the welfare of 
the South (Chin & Grossman, 1990; Vishwasrao, 1994; Gould and 
Gruben, 1996; MacLaughlin et al, 1988).  The case will be used to 
demonstrate how Pioneer prices the product, how the distribution chain 
handles the product, and how farmers use the product.  Results will 
provide insight into how farmers’ welfare is impacted either directly from 
a change in prices or indirectly from the level of technology. 
 
 
Proposition #8   Weak IPR lowers the speed on technology’s entry into the South (Stamm, 
1993 and Chin and Grossman, 1990). This has important welfare 
implications as quality available to the South is reduced (Globerman, 
1988).  The corn and soybean business units will be compared to look at 
 
  10 product offerings.  The case is valuable because direct comparisons can be 
made with Pioneers product offerings in the North between the two 
businesses and the lag time before these products reach Argentina. 
 
Proposition #9   Weak IPR promotes diffusion of new technology (Chin and Grossman, 
1990; Stamm, 1993).  Under weak IPR prices should fall (Globerman, 
1988; Diwan and Rodrik, 1991) allowing for greater distribution of the 
product.  This proposition is juxtaposed against Proposition #8 that 
supports the idea of less technology rather than more.  Thus the lag of the 
technology rollout (#8) is a force maintaining the technological disparities 
between the North and the South while lower prices from weak IPR 
promotes the rapid diffusion of (dated?) technology; a force for 
equalization of technology between the North and the South.  The case 




As noted above, the theoretical models help to provide a framework to analyze the 
welfare impacts but are lacking in their conclusiveness. This makes it difficult from theory alone 
to convince either side of the true welfare impacts.  In an attempt to shed more light onto the 
question of welfare impacts, a few empirical studies have been conducted to try and measure 
impact.  Empirical research in this area too is problematic.  Writing in a 1993 survey of the 
empirical work to date, Helpman (1993) concludes that there exists very little evidence on the 
welfare effects of international infringements of IPRs.  Similarly, writing in 1994 Maskus and 
Konan remark that there is a surprising paucity of empirical evidence concerning the most 
critical issues at hand.  Subramanian (1995) echoes the sentiments of the lack of quantitative 
estimates of the Southern welfare impacts.  Therefore, on the topic of understanding the 
phenomenon of North-South welfare impacts, the empirical attempts have not been much more 
successful than the theoretical models. 
 
  11 To date there have been five
1 key studies: the first is Braga and Willmore’s use of 1981 
survey data of 3,000 Brazilian industrial firms; the second is the United States International 
Trade Commission (USITC) survey conducted in 1986 of 736 US firms; the third is Gadbaw and 
Richards’s 1998 statistical overview of four LDC counties using aggregated secondary data, the 
fourth is Mansfield’s 1994 survey of 100 US firms; finally the most recent research on this topic 
is Pray et al’s work in China (2001) that departs from the firm-level approach and surveys 
consumers (farmers) of technology in order to directly assess the benefits to them of exploiting 
weak property rights.  
Braga and Willmore’s study comprised a qualitative survey of 3,000 Brazilian industrial 
firms in 1981 linking the lack of a strong property rights to low levels of local technological 
innovation (Braga and Willmore, 1991).  The qualitative survey queried industrial firms about 
the relationship between the IP environment and their willingness to invest or purchase 
technology from abroad (Gould and Gruben, 1996).  It provided the first empirical evidence of 
the impact of weak IPR on Southern domestic firms’ willingness to invest.  
The United States International Trade Commission surveyed 736 U.S. firms in 1986 
asking those firms to assess the impact of weak foreign property rights on their profits (USITC, 
1988).  The methodology used was a mailed structured survey asking “Fortune 500" firms about 
the impact on their business of weak foreign IPR.  Losses were estimated at 2.7% of sales, with 
losses in one industry as high as 21% of sales.  Infringement and enforcement costs were 
estimated at .03% of sales. 
 Feinberg and Rousslang (1990) using the USITC data set expanded its scope of analysis. 
 They attempted to estimate the static welfare consequences of weak foreign property rights on 
 
  12 innovating firms, local infringers, and consumers.  They found that while losses are significant to 
the legitimate firms, they might be less than the sum total of benefits to consumers and 
infringers.  Consumers benefit from greater price competition and infringers (producing close 
substitutes) benefit from the inelastic demand for the product and the low marginal costs of 
infringing.  As the authors point out, their study does not account for among other things the 
negative investment impacts arising from weak IPR in the South. 
Gadbaw and Richards (1988) used USITC data as well to estimate the “right owner 
revenues” in the absence of piracy, thus the empirical focus is on the loss of sales not 
investment.  The authors admit it is a daunting task as they are using estimates of demand and 
price elasticities garnered from interviews.  Thus like the Braga and Willmore study, the estimate 
of investment or sales foregone due to piracy is difficult to address because the analysis reflects a 
partial equilibrium analysis and is subjective and static.  
Mansfield (1994), using a similar methodology to Braga and Willmore and the USITC, 
surveyed 100 major U.S. firms in 1991.  The response rate was 94% and respondents were 
generally patent attorneys, specialists in the firms’ international operations or top executives 
(Mansfield, 1994).  He found that the IPR environment had an important effect on some foreign 
direct investment.   More of the effect was felt in R&D and less felt in sales and distribution.   
Similarly Mansfield found that much of the hesitancy involved the transfer of technology, not 
necessarily investment in general.  This suggests that more of the impact of weak IPR concerns 
intellectual property questions not necessarily investment in general.  Our case study will 
directly address this question to see if investment effects are limited to IP or are there spillovers 
to other investments as well.  
 
  13 Most recently, Pray et al. (2001) studied the adoption of Bt cotton in China using a 
survey of 283 farmers in Northern China.  Their work documents quite clearly the incentives for 
local producers to adopt technology when property rights are weak. While their work is excellent 
at describing the motivation.  Firm impacts and host country impacts net of producer impacts 
were not part of the study. 
As Helpman has pointed out empirical work assessing welfare impacts has been lacking.  
While Sherwood and Braga (1996) note that the question is essentially empirical, they as well as 
Maskus and Konan (1994) also admit the difficulty in making welfare estimates.  There is not 
only an inherent complexity to the problem, but the dynamic effects are difficult to capture and 
modeling in this area requires assumptions that are fundamental to the outcome.  Feinberg and 
Rousslang (1990) find the empirical task difficult because much of the primary data that has 
been used is self-reported and involves so many estimates.  
We offer an alternative empirical approach that recognizes the empirical challenges while 
at the same time integrating the rich theoretical literature. It is hoped by looking at this question 
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Numerous propositions about the impact of IPR protection on firm and host country 
impacts emerge from the theoretical models.  A review of the literature of empirical studies 
attempting to answer some of the fundamental welfare questions about IPR protection provides 
only weak evidence.  Part of cause for weak evidence is the complexity of the IPR welfare situation.  As noted above there are numerous factors affecting hosts country and firm welfare 
and these factors can be contradictory.  A second component causing the lack of factual clarity is 
that empirical measurement is difficult.  While these empirical methodologies used to date have 
been effective contributing to the debate over IPR protection, they are unable to get at the central 
issue of measuring and documenting welfare impact.  This is because they are at least one degree 
removed from actors, investments, and transactions that comprise the welfare assessment.  
Additionally the empirical effort is complicated because much of the empirical 
assessment of IPR protection attempts to measure the investment or transaction that was never 
made.  These are the negative effects host country and firms derive from investments purportedly 
not made.  Measuring this is difficult.  We think our methodology solves that problem. When 
researchers query northern firms about the impact of IPR protection they undoubtedly say that is 
harmful to their company because revenues are so low from the lack IPR protection that 
investments in the pirated product are untenable (i.e. Illinois Farm Bureau, 1998).  But is this 
true?  Can we measure it?  Welfare analysis is about weighing benefits and costs, but without 
measurement how can we perform the analysis?  Executives describe transactions not conducted 
and investments not made, how might they be measured?  Once measured then a proper welfare 
analysis can take place, and the theoretical propositions above can be assessed.   
We think we have come up with such a methodology and an empirical setting that will 
address the problem of measuring the investment not made.  The subject of our study is the firm 
Pioneer- Argentina.  Pioneer is a subsidiary of the multinational division Pioneer Hi-Bred 
International that is part of Dupont de Nemours.  Pioneer-Argentina is in the business of 
producing and selling agricultural seed to farmers.  Total sales for 2000 were $35 million and the 
 
  15 firm employs 105 people. The firm sells a variety of cultivars (Figure 1), but their dominant 
business is corn and soybean seeds.  Herein lies the uniqueness of the empirical setting and its 
value for addressing the question of the welfare implications of IPR protection.   
Corn and soybeans are complements.  Agronomic convention holds that neither corn nor 
soybeans be grown in the same field in a continuous fashion.  A producer may be able to get 
away with two years of continuous rotation but beyond that soil fertility suffers and weed and 
disease impacts increase.   Therefore corn and soybeans are grown in rotation with 50% of a 
farm’s acreage in corn and 50% in soybeans.  In any given year though relative prices and input 
costs may provide an incentive to move away from a 50-50 split, but as mentioned above 
deviating far from a rotation over a long period of time is not possible.  The impact for retail 
seed suppliers is that offering both corn and soybean seed is a successful strategy as there are 
very few pure corn farmers or pure soybean farmers.  A farmer needs both products.  A firm can 
effectively offer both types of seeds because brands are important and it affords one-stop 
shopping.   
A second feature that makes the case unique and valuable for studying the IPR issue is 
that Argentinean crop production is very similar to that in the US.  The center of the corn and 
soybean area, e.g. the province of Buenos Aires, is the 32
nd parallel (south) comparable to the 
Mid-South region of the US.  Thus US varieties and agronomic practices transfer readily to 
Argentinean producers.  This makes the preferences between the North (US) and the South 
(Argentina) relatively homogeneous.  In the year 2000, Argentina cultivated 3,326,000 hectares 
of corn and 10,300,000 hectares of soybeans (Secretaria de Agricultura, Ganaderia y Pesca 
(SAGyP), 2000).  Argentina is the world’s second largest corn exporter (USDA, 1997) and the 
 
  16 world’s third leading soybean producer (Elliott, 2000).  
To produce seed (for the North or South), a firm like Pioneer takes three general 
strategies.  The first (I), involves extensive R&D to develop seed characteristics that can be 
introduced into adapted and successful existing germplasm.  An example would be the 
development of transgenic events, i.e. Round Ready® tolerance, and then marketing that 
technology through the best varieties/germplasm.  Therefore Monsanto, as an R&D company, 
would purchase a company like Asgrow, a producer and marketer of seed, in order to get its 
technology out into market (Goldsmith, 2001).  This would be the high risk-high return strategy 
that has dominated the life sciences industry over the last decade (Goldsmith, 2001). 
A second strategy (II) and more common in markets of developing countries is for firms 
to take already developed seed varieties and adapt them to the local environment.  This still 
involves significant investment in seed research trials with extensive breeding programs and 
field plots in the local (Southern) environment.  As long as the foreign region is relatively 
homogeneous to that of the central R&D area of the US, Strategy I is unnecessary and Strategy II 
suffices.  An example of this is northern Brazil where Strategy II is not applicable because of the 
tropical climate and high aluminum soils (Mcvey et al, 2000).  Local investment in R&D by 
EMBRAPA, Brazil’s agricultural research system is necessary because direct technology 
transfers are agronomically inappropriate. 
The third strategy (III), involves essentially no investment.  A seed company simply 
exports the seed directly from the North to the South with no adaptation.  The more comparable 
the northern environment is to the southern environment the less likely a crop failure would arise 
due to poor adaptation.  It is important to note that a seed firm can never know with certainty that 
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ante the firm may be confident, but only after the seed has been purchased, planted and grown 
does the adaptiveness reveal itself.   Thus older varieties are less risky, but represent older 
technology.   
An anecdotal example of this situation was Pioneer’s “Rio Cuarto” incident in 1994.  
According to current management, and confirmed by competitors, the firm’s previous 
management took short cuts adapting US corn varieties to Argentina.  A deadly fungus, named 
Rio Cuarto (the province where the greatest outbreak occurred) wiped out corn crops planted 
with Pioneer products, doing tremendous damage to its brand image.  Even in the year 2000, the 
firm was still attempting to rebuild confidence in its products.  This highlights the inherent risks 
transferring varieties directly from one region to another. 
Strategy I (high R&D) is not pertinent to a company like Pioneer Argentina because the 
agronomic differences are small and market opportunities specific to Argentina are relatively 
minor for new technology development.  New technologies available to Northern producers in 
North America and Europe can be successfully introduced in Argentina.  Roundup Ready® 
technology for example is easily introduced into the many local varieties found in the US, 
Europe and South America.  
Pioneer does have a choice between Strategy II (moderate investment) and Strategy III 
(no investment) and this option is the crux of our empirical approach.  Pioneer is world leader in 
corn and soybean seed production and sale.  Farmers in Argentina need both products and 
Pioneer wants to offer both products.  The uniqueness of the situation whereby Argentina 
agronomically is directly comparable to the US affords a firm like Pioneer the opportunity to 
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Type II with significant R&D and Argentinean farmers would receive the most advanced 
technology adapted to their country’s environment, or the firm can under-invest and choose a 
Type III strategy and completely free-ride off of investments made in the North.  Corn and 
soybeans do not have to be treated the same.  That is corn can be Type II while soybeans kept at 
Type III.   
As revealed in our interviews with the company, their objective (not surprisingly) is 
profitability, which can be translated as return on investment (ROI).  They are not wed to one 
strategy or another or matching a product, i.e. corn, with a certain strategy.  They clearly 
expressed that their objective was profitability and the strategy (either II or III) would be used 
for the division that best achieved those objectives.  Therefore as an endogenous choice problem, 
the corn or soybean divisions could either involve moderate or no investment.  Ceteris paribus, 
according to Pioneer management, high investment is preferred to low investment.  Thus if 
business conditions were ideal, the welfare of the firm is greatest under Strategy II, high 
investment.  
The empirical question of this paper is not why Pioneer chooses one strategy or another, 
but to compare the welfare impacts of a Type II strategy versus a Type III strategy.  In order to 
effectively perform the welfare analysis, a comparative case is valuable.  In the Pioneer situation 
what are the benefits and costs for both the firm and the host country of the high investment 
decision and what are the benefits and costs of the low investment decision?   
A final unique and valuable feature of this case is the cross-country differences in 
institutional environments are controlled.  This is because even though Pioneer’s strategic choice 
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from IP piracy and soybeans are not.    Therefore our methodology controls for the property 
rights environment, the market structure, and demand (farmers).  The reason that the corn 
division can be operated differently from the soybean division is that corn is a hybrid and 
soybeans are not.  A corn plant is pollinated only by means of another corn plant.  If corn seed is 
saved from one year to next, the corn plant loses its hybrid (cross-pollination) vigor and 
performs very poorly.  Therefore a farmer must return each year to the seller of seed to get a new 
version of the hybrid that has been properly crossed.   
Soybeans on the other hand are self-pollinating and can keep reproducing in perpetuity.  A 
farmer can take seed from the crop just harvested and replant them the following year.  In this 
way a farmer who plants soybeans does not have to return to the seed supplier every year for new 
seed, dramatically lowering the cost of the seed input.   In the US 25% (Hayenga, 1998) of the 
soybean seed is saved-seed.  Most farmers still have an incentive to purchase new seed every year 
because new varieties perform better.  Saved-seed will have a yield drag on average of 2.4% 
(Purdue University in Illinois Agrinews, 2001).  Also purchased seed tends to be more consistent 
and reliable.  In the last few years an added incentive, in the US and Canada, to purchase soybean 
seed on a yearly basis has been Monsanto’s introduction and enforcement of a grower contract 
that stipulates that seed can not be saved as it infringes on Monsanto’s patent rights (Goldsmith, 
2001).  Under the weak property rights conditions of Argentina, this last incentive does not exist. 
 Our interviews with farmers and industry representatives in Argentina feel that the yield drag 
from saved-seed is closer to 1% - 2% per year for them and well worth absorbing, given that seed 
costs are so much lower.  Because of this unique agronomic feature we are able to study Pioneer’s 
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selling soybeans is that corn’s IP is naturally protected while soybean’s is not.  
With the objective of this research being to measure the effects of weak property rights, 
the Pioneer Argentina case serves as a valuable empirical setting.  Since the two goods are 
complements and operate side by side, they can be directly compared.  Because both divisions 
operate in the same country any differences in institutional environment is corrected for.  Because 
the divisions operate within the same company differences in business behavior across firms is 
corrected for.  A study of Pioneer Argentina is a unique opportunity to compare the two divisions 
and assess how the divisions are operated, where investments are made, what costs are incurred, 
what revenues are generated, what seed prices are charged, and how seed is distributed.  Based on 
theory of IPR protection, the impacts of the two strategies should be different.  These differences 
then will provide evidence of welfare impacts derived from the set of theoretical propositions 
listed earlier. 
To explore this unique empirical situation the case study method was selected.  The lack 
of empirical evidence generated by previous methodologies in this area led us to believe that a 
more microeconomic approach was necessary.  The case study method is valuable where depth of 
analysis is important.  The ability to achieve depth is also the case study approach’s weakness, in 
that only “one” observation is being used.  In all of the studies mentioned above numerous 
observations were used and statistically significant results were estimated.  As numerous authors 
have noted though, the application of those results to the phenomena has not been significantly 
illuminating.  The case-study method used in this research greatly narrows the focus with the 
intent of improving the quality of the empirical evidence.  The case study approach’s narrow 
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studies nor narrowly focused case studies are the perfect empirical methodology (Yin, 1994; 
Westgren and Zering, 1998; Gummesson, 2000).  Both have their place and we suggest that case 
study method when applied to the situation of Pioneer Argentina adds important insights into the 
North-South debate over IPR protection. 
 
Approach 
As in quantitative research, there are numerous case study methodologies.  For the 
purposes of this inquiry, a deductive approach is employed.  That is the case study is used to help 
provide empirical evidence about a phenomena that to date has been understood from theoretical, 
anecdotal, and limited empirical perspectives.  Yin calls this the critical case study model and is 
built upon existing theory and guided by specific propositions.  Its goal is to test theory instead of 
creating theory.  Specific questions still remain as to how IPR protection actually affects farmers, 
firms, supply chains, and host countries.  Theory, as noted above, abounds about how we think 
welfare is impacted and the theory yearns for some empirical evidence. 
Evidence 
   The study used the following sources of evidence: key informant interviews, direct 
observation, and quantitative data (financial documents analysis and industry statistics).  To 
conduct the interviews a semi-structured interview instrument was administered to over 30 key 
informants representing Pioneer and its various divisions, the Argentinean seed industry, supply 
chain members, and government (Figure1).  Following Kumar (1989) guidelines for rapid 
appraisal, these interviews were qualitative and directed to carefully selected subjects. 
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theory.  Depending on the informant’s role or organization, some of the question might not have 
been asked.  In general questions focused on business operations, investment, and intellectual 
property.  The theme was always comparing the corn seed business with the soybean seed 
business.   While an attempt was made to introduce the questions in the same order, it was not 
uncommon for respondents to shift off topic.  The interviewers did keep track of those questions 
that remained unanswered and worked them back into the interview so that each informant 
addressed as many of the same questions as possible.   This technique allowed for answer 
triangulation so that any significant answer from one respondent was validated by other 
informants.    Following Kumar (1989), interviews were conducted with help of a previously 
designed interview guide taking special care to the way questions were worded in an attempt to 
maintain as neutral an attitude as possible.   
Maintaining an easily retrievable case study database is critical to assure the validity of a 
case study (Yin, 1994). In this ways it is possible to re-inspect the data by the author or from other 
researchers.  With this in mind all interviews were recorded in both audio and digital video 
formats.  Almost all interviews were conducted in Spanish.  Spanish language transcripts were 
produced and were analyzed using a qualitative data analysis software program called QSR 
NUD*IST- N5® (QSR International, 2000). 
 
Direct Observation 
Structured direct observation, according to Kumar (1989), can be an extremely useful in the data 
triangulation process.  Armed with theoretical expectations about investment and expenditure 
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technology, human resources, and advertising and marketing.  Our use of the digital video 
equipment as well as photographs helped to document what investments were made and what 
equipment was being used for each business unit. To conduct the observations of physical assets 




Yin (1994) suggests that the best use for documents is to augment the evidence from other 
sources.  Pioneer, Argentina provided us access to their financial records. Records are maintained 
separately between the two business units.  Therefore an analysis of the balance sheet, income 
statements, and pricing data were made available to the authors.  Due to the sensitivity of the 
material, ratios comparing the corn and soybean units will be used whenever possible. The 
financial data serves three purposes; first it is useful to corroborate the responses of Pioneer 
managers as to the state of each of the businesses; second the data can be used to analyze the 
propositions pertaining to the difference financial impacts weak IPR protection has on a firm; 
third the data helps to quantify the welfare impacts. 
 
Methodological Validity 
As numerous authors (Yin, 1994; Gummesson, 2000; Westgren and Zering, 1998) have 
noted, there is no hierarchy of research methodology.  Of the many tools available to researchers 
each has an appropriate place.  There is no perfect research methodology that serves all criteria 
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Researchers offer several tests of validity with respect to the case study method.  The 
validity test is: does the empirical evidence in fact correspond to the phenomena under study 
(Gummesson, 2000).  Our study employs the single case approach.  Therefore is the case of 
Pioneer Argentina and the research design valid for analyzing the phenomena of firm and host 
country welfare impact from weak IPR protection?  In order to make the validity argument there 
are numerous design options many of which this research incorporated and some of which it did 
not.   
First, theoretical grounding adds formality and discipline to the research process.   
Because of our extensive use of the theoretical literature, supported by the more limited empirical 
evidence, we would argue that Pioneer is a valid context by which to study the phenomena.  
Contributing to the methodological validity is our research design and implementation such that 
our research could be replicated within the same context or transferred to a new context.   
The second important aspect of empirical validity with respect to the single case study 
approach is its context.  Does the study of Pioneer effectively incorporate the phenomena of 
question (see Westgren and Zering, 1998)?  The explicit discussion above, detailing the 
uniqueness of the Pioneer case to study the IPR question, constitutes our argument that this case 
provides an excellent context by which to analyze the phenomena.   
Third is the depth of the research, what Yin calls embeddedness.  Cross-sectional data (i.e. 
USITC, 1988 Mansfield, 1994 and Braga and Willmore, 1991) provides a form of breadth of 
analysis.  The single case study approach, on the other hand, allows depth of analysis.  In our 
case, embeddedness was captured through in-depth interviews, multiple interviews within the 
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Fourth is the issue of triangulation, which asks multiple parties the same questions to see 
if their responses corroborate each other.  While not all answers need not be “identical,” they 
should be consistent.  If they are not consistent, then a reason needs to be found.  Triangulation 
was achieved by: conducting multiple interviews within the same firm; interviewing competitors, 
supply chain members, and third parties (i.e. government); analyzing quantitative data (firm and 
industry, and national); and conducting and documenting direct observations.  In this way a 
consistent and reliable picture of the phenomena is created.   
A fifth contributor to empirical validity is the use of multiple cases to analyze the same 
phenomena.  Additional cases demonstrate reliability and in that way contribute to the robustness 
of the conclusions.  In this way our methodology is lacking.  With multiple cases there is always 
the question of cost and time.  More significant in our situation would be replicating the level of 
intimacy with the company under study.  We were very lucky to have had such a high level of 
access.  This depth of access compensates for the lack of additional cases. 
Finally, case study researchers recognize that longitudinal analysis adds power to the 
results by limiting the possibility of serendipity.  Helpman (1993) notes the importance of 
dynamics when assessing the welfare impacts from weak IPR.  This too is a valid critique of our 
methodology where more time spent is studying a phenomena is usually better.  Because our 
analysis is static we are going to have to impute the dynamic implications of the firm’s behavior. 
 
 
  26 Results and Discussion 
 
At the time of the publication of this draft the results were not completed thus they were not 
included.
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Figure 1:  Overview of Key Informant Interviews
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  33 Endnotes 
                                                 
1.Two other empirical studies were not mentioned.  Subramanian (1995) studied prices of specific 
pharmaceuticals and used previous estimates of price elasticities to estimate welfare effects for 
the northern firm and the southern country.  Maskus and Konan (1994) used the estimates of 
Gadbaw and Richards (1988) to study the welfare effects of licensing in a southern setting.  
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